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During the last decades a consensus has emerged that it is impossible to disentangle liquidity 
shocks from solvency shocks. As a consequence the classical lender of last resort rules, as 
defined by Thornton and Bagehot, based on lending to solvent illiquid institutions appear ill-
suited to this environment. We summarize here the main contributions that have developed 
considering this new paradigm and discuss how institutional features relating to bank closure 
policy influences lender of last resort and other safety net issues. We devote particular 
emphasis to the analysis of systemic risk and contagion in banking and the role of the lender 
of last resort to prevent it. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the creation of the first central banks (CB) in the XIXth century, the existence of a lender of 
last resort (LOLR) has been a key issue for the structure of the banking industry. The banking 
system  has  to  provide  mechanisms  to  manage  banks’  liquidity  risk  because  one  of  the  major 
functions of banks is to offer access to the payment system and facilitate property rights transfer, 
and because it is efficient to combine these functions with opaque long term investments on the 
asset side (delegated monitoring) and with demand deposits on the liability side (as justified by 
Diamond, 1984, Diamond and Dybvig, 1983, Calomiris and Kahn, 1991, or Diamond and Rajan, 
2001). Although in any developed economy, the principal mechanism to cope with both excesses 
and shortages of liquidity will be the interbank market, the well functioning of the banking system 
might still require an additional mechanism to avoid that both aggregate and bank specific liquidity 
risk mismanagement results in a bank defaulting on its contractual obligations. The terminology “of 
last resort” itself emphasizes that this institution is not intended to replace existing regular market 
mechanisms, but should make up for its possible, although infrequent, failures. This justifies the 
existence of a discount window in the US and the marginal lending facility in Europe. 
The basic objective of lender of last resort lending were first formulated by Thornton (1802) 
and Bagehot (1873) who argued that it was necessary in order to support the whole financial system 
and to provide stable money  growth (Humphrey, 1989). Since then, the role of the  LOLR has 
become a more controversial issue. The debate is inherent to the fact that, by providing insolvent 
banks, with liquidity we are allowing them to escape market discipline, and promoting forbearance. 
Clearly, there is a consensus among academics and central bankers that a mechanism should exist to 
allow  solvent  banks  to  obtain  liquidity  if  the  interbank  market  fails  to  operate  correctly.  Also, 
everyone agrees that insolvent banks should not access the standard liquidity facilities and that, if 
necessary, their insolvency should be dealt with on a case by case basis. The problem arises because 
liquidity shocks affecting banks might be undistinguishable from solvency shocks. So, the debate   3 
about the role of the LOLR is connected to the efficient bank closure policy and, more generally, to 
the costs of bank failures and of the safety net.  
This connection between the LOLR and bank bail-out policy is not yet fully accepted. This 
may be due to the fact that access to liquidity, as well as the role of the LOLR has evolved through 
history. Those accepting Bagehot’s view of the LOLR may argue that it relates to a world where 
solvent banks were to be protected against sudden deposit withdrawals without the recourse of a 
well  developed  repo  market  and  without  the  CB  privilege  of  issuing  fiat  money.  With  the 
emergence  of  a  well-functioning  repo  market,  today’s  conception  of  the  role  of  the  LOLR  is 
completely different. The LOLR may step in exceptionally to prevent a collapse of the payment 
system that could be triggered by the lack of liquidity, but this should normally be dealt with by 
means  of  the  appropriate  monetary  policy.  So,  if  the  money  markets  are  well-functioning,  the 
LOLR should manage aggregate liquidity only and leave the issue of solvency to the market that 
will eliminate the lame ducks.  
The critical step in this argument is the assumption of perfect money markets. Once we 
consider  imperfect  money  markets  we  are  forced  to  consider  cases  where  it  is  impossible  to 
distinguish whether a bank is solvent or insolvent. So, we have to acknowledge that in solvency 
cases the LOLR is sometimes acting to channel liquidity and therefore is improving the efficiency 
of the monetary policy framework, while in the second case it is part of the safety net and directly 
related to the overall regulatory framework. Therefore the design of an optimal LOLR mechanism 
has to take into account both the monetary framework and the banking regulation context.  
Consequently,  we  argue  that  it  would  be  erroneous  to  adopt  a  narrow  definition  of  the 
LOLR, stating that its role should be limited to the provision of liquidity, while capital injections 
should be the Treasury responsibility. This would lead to a very simplistic analysis of the LOLR 
functions, as the complex decisions would be either ignored or handed over to the Treasury. In our 
view,  such  a  narrow  view  of  the  LOLR  would  be  simply  confusing  by  creating  an  artificial 
separation between lending by the LOLR at no risk (but at a cost to other claimholders as uninsured   4 
depositors or the Deposit Insurance Company) and the closure or bail-out decision by the Treasury. 
In fact, it is not credible to think that a systemic, too-big-to fail institution needing the support of 
the  LOLR  might  be  denied  it,  and  a  conceptual  framework  that  would  lead  to  the  opposite 
conclusion is suspect of oversimplification. 
On the contrary the rigorous view of the LOLR that we take here has to be a broad one, 
encompassing the closure or bail-out decision defining the LOLR as an agency that has the faculty 
to extend credit to a financial institution unable to secure funds through the regular circuit. This 
definition omits any mention to the fact that the institution is illiquid or insolvent. Obviously, this 
does not preclude that a separation between LOLR and Treasury decisions might prove efficient. 
Yet, what it implies is that it has to be proven so. This broad definition has the additional benefit to 
also encompass the management of overall banking crises, which would be difficult to consider 
from the narrow perspective of pure liquidity provision. 
Once we agree that the LOLR policy has to be part of the overall banking safety net, the 
interdependence of the different components of this safety net becomes clear. First, the existence or 
not of a deposit insurance system, as well documented in Santos (2006) limits the social cost of a 
bank’s  bankruptcy,  and  therefore,  reduces  the  instances  where  a  LOLR  intervention  will  be 
required. Second, capital regulation reduces the probability of a bank in default being effectively 
insolvent, and so has a similar role in limiting the costly intervention of the LOLR. Third, the 
procedures to bail-out or liquidate a bank, determined by the legal and enforcement framework will 
determine the cost-benefit analysis of a LOLR intervention.  
Obviously,  the  LOLR  policy  and  its  efficiency  will  depend  upon  the  overall  financial 
environment. When a liquid market for Certificates of Deposit (CDs), T-Bill and securitized loans, 
or even simply for the loans themselves exists, banks will only exceptionally encounter difficulties 
in coping with their liquidity shocks. Adopting a perspective of an all-embracing safety net does 
not mean that the safety net has to be the responsibility of a unique agent. Often several regulatory 
agencies interact, because different functions related to the well functioning of the safety net are   5 
allocated  to  different  agents.  It  is  quite  reasonable  to  separate  monetary  policy  from  banking 
regulation, and the separation of the deposit insurance company from the CB makes the cost of 
deposit insurance more transparent. Also, the national jurisdiction of regulation makes cross border 
banking  a  joint  responsibility  for  the  home  and  host  regulatory  agencies.  This  implies  that 
regulation will be the outcome of a game among different agents that may cooperate or may be 
facing conflicts. 
Finally, as part of the financial environment, the regulatory structure will be crucial. In 
particular, LOLR functions are usually attributed to the CB, while another institution, often the 
Deposit Insurance Company, is in charge of closure. So, how the two decisions are coordinated is 
clearly an issue to be considered.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we will examine the justification 
of LOLR lending in a simplified framework where only liquidity shocks arise. Then, Section 3 will 
consider contagion in the interbank market.  Section 4 will be devoted to the case where liquidity 
shocks cannot be disentangled from solvency ones.  Section 5 discusses the issues raised by the 
implementation and decentralization of the LOLR policy within the safety net.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Pure liquidity shocks 
 
As already mentioned, one of the major features of banks, and a justification of their existence, is 
that they combine assets with a long maturity with short-lived liabilities. As a consequence, an 
institution providing liquidity to the banking system has a key role in the well-functioning of the 
whole credit, deposit and payment system. We will study here what types of liquidity shocks might 
affect  banks  and  how  Emergency  Liquidity  Assistance  (ELA)  may  help  them  cope  with  those 
shocks. Still, setting a framework that explains why banks may face liquidity risk does not mean 
that  a  LOLR  should  exist.  First,  it  could  be  argued  that  monetary  policy,  jointly  with  peer 
monitoring could solve the problem. Second, even if a specific institution is required, a private   6 
LOLR without any privileged access to CB liquidity could provide liquidity to the banks that need 
it.  
We will first examine the different models of pure liquidity shocks, then turn to the analysis 
of a pure liquidity shock event, the disruption of the market as a result of the events of 9/11/2001, 
and close this section by discussing the pros and cons of a private LOLR based on the historical 
evidence. 
 
2.1 Maturities transformation 
The main motivation for LOLR in a modern economy is the need to prevent the threat of systemic 
risk  whereby  the  crisis  of  one  financial  institution  may  affect  others.  In  turn,  the  fragility  of 
individual financial institutions stems from the very notion of the “fractional reserve system“ where 
short term deposits finance illiquid long term investments.  
The classical models of Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that a bank 
that offers demand deposits, invests the proceeds in illiquid assets, and keeps an amount of liquidity 
equal to the expected value of the liquidity needs of its depositors, can offer a valuable insurance 
function to consumers who are uncertain about the time of their consumption needs.  However, the 
transformation of maturities exposes the bank to threat of bank runs if a large number of depositors 
decide to withdraw their money for reasons other than liquidity.    
  In this approach there are two possible equilibria. In the efficient one depositors withdraw 
only to satisfy their interim consumption needs thus allowing the illiquid investment to mature. But 
given that the value of bank assets does not cover the contractual obligations of the bank with its 
depositors at the interim stage there is also an inefficient equilibrium, where it is optimal for all 
depositors to withdraw early (a run), even for those that have no immediate consumption needs. 
This may cause the “fire sale” of long term or illiquid assets.  Although deposit insurance and 
prudential regulation have essentially confined bank runs to text book phenomena they have not   7 
completely disappeared even in sophisticated banking systems, witness the run on the deposits of 
the mortgage lender Northern Rock in 2007, the first such event in Britain since 1866. 
The traditional way to address equilibrium selection is to imagine that depositors behave in a 
way or in another depending on an exogenous event (a “sunspot” in the jargon of this literature). 
Since  in  one  equilibrium  banks  increase  welfare  and  in  the  other  they  decrease  welfare,  the 
impossibility to establish which equilibrium will prevail makes it impossible to determine whether 
it is ex ante desirable that banks arise as providers of inter temporal consumption insurance. In other 
words it is not clear why consumers would find it optimal to deposit their money in a bank in the 
first place. As a consequence, absent regulatory safeguards, policy recommendations are based on 
the  assumption  that  a  particular  equilibrium  will  prevail,  an  issue  that  more  recent  modelling 
approaches  using  global  games  is  not  faced  with  as  we  will  see  in  the  sequel.  Despite  this 
shortcoming, the Bryant, Diamond-Dybvig approach has been the modern draught-horse for the 
study of financial instability and systemic risk.
1  
 
2.2. Systemic risk 
Financially fragile intermediaries are exposed to the threat of systemic risk. Systemic risk may arise 
from the existence of a network of financial contracts from several types of operations: the payment 
system, the interbank market, and the market for derivatives. The tremendous growth experienced 
by these operations in the last decades increases the degree of interconnections among operators and 
among countries and thus the potential for contagion. 
A number of papers have modelled contagion among banks and the ways to prevent it. The 
discussion will focus here on the two we consider most relevant. Allen-Gale (2000) show that 
                                                 
1 One of the major features of the subprime crisis of 2007, the fact that maturity transformation 
takes  place  off  balance  sheet,  and  therefore  escapes  banking  regulation  and  the  regulatory 
mechanisms to prevent runs, is to be considered also from this point of view: a liquidity crisis in a 
conduit or Special Purpose Vehicle, that is funded through a roll over of short term debt is akin 
from the point of view of liquidity to a holding bank with an unregulated subsidiary where bank 
runs can occur.    8 
financial contagion can emerge in a banking system of a multi-region economy. The interbank 
deposit  market  offers  insurance  against  regional  liquidity  shocks  but  provides  also  a  channel 
through which the shocks to the agents’ preferences in one region can spread over other regions. 
Allen and Gale (2000) consider a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with several regions in 
which the number of early consumers (the ones demanding liquidity at an interim stage) and late 
consumers fluctuate. An interbank market in deposits allows insurance as regions with liquidity 
surpluses provide it to regions with shortages. This constitutes an efficient mechanism provided 
there is enough aggregate liquidity. But if there is shortage of aggregate liquidity the interbank 
deposit market can turn into the channel through which a crisis spreads. Facing a liquidity crisis, 
before liquidating long term investments banks liquidate their deposits in other banks, a strategy 
that in the aggregate just cancels out.  In case of shortage of aggregate liquidity the only way to 
increase consumption good early is eventually to liquidate long term investments. A financial crisis 
in one region can thus spread via contagion. Note that the nature of the crisis, and of the solution, is 
different with respect to the market for retail deposits as e.g. in the Diamond-Dybvig model. In the 
retail market runs occur because banks liquidate when they have insufficient liquidity to meet the 
fixed payment of the deposit contracts. Hence by making the contracts contingent or discretionary, 
incentive to run can be eliminated. In the interbank markets instead, the reciprocal nature of the 
deposit  agreements  makes  these  solutions  impossible.    Moreover,  the  likelihood  that  contagion 
happens depends on the architecture of the interbank deposits. If each region is connected with all 
the others the initial impact of the crisis can be attenuated and contagion avoided. On the contrary, 
if each region is connected with few others the impact of the initial crisis may be felt strongly on the 
neighbouring regions.  
  Using  the  notion  that  participants  in  financial  markets  may  have  different  beliefs 
Castiglionesi (2007) extends the basic framework of Allen and Gale (2000) to ask if there is any 
instrument  to  avoid  contagion.  He  argues  that  contagion  is  due  to  the  impossibility  to  sign 
contingent  contracts  on  unforeseen  contingencies.  This  happens  because  the  CB  and  market   9 
participants (banks and depositors) disagree on the prior of certain events; in particular they don’t 
think that aggregate liquidity shortage is possible, hence they don’t write contracts contingent on 
this event; the CB instead believes that with positive although small probability aggregate liquidity 
shortage is possible and can thus improve matters by imposing reserve requirements. 
In Freixas, Parigi, Rochet (2000) (FPR) a system of interbank credit lines arises because 
depositors face uncertainty about where they need to consume. Financial connections reduce the 
cost of holding liquidity but make the banking system prone to experience speculative gridlocks 
even if all banks are solvent. The mechanism of the gridlock is the following: if the depositors in 
one  location,  wishing  to  consume  in  another  location,  believe  that  there  will  be  not  enough 
resources for their consumption at the location of destination, their best response is to withdraw 
their deposits at their home location. This triggers the early liquidation of the investment in the 
home location, which, by backward induction, makes it optimal for the depositors in other locations 
to do the same. The CB can play a role of crisis manager: when all banks are solvent the CB’s role 
is  simply  to  act  as  a  coordinating  device  by  guaranteeing  credit  lines  of  all  banks.  Since  the 
guarantees  are  not  used  in  equilibrium  this  action  entails  no  cost.  When  instead  one  bank  is 
insolvent because of poor returns on its investment the CB has a role in the closure of this bank, 
which has to be conducted in an orderly fashion to maintain the well-functioning of the payment 
network despite the closure of one bank. 
Both Allen and Gale (2000) and FPR (2000) emphasize the key role the interbank market 
plays in propagating a crisis through the intertwining of their balance sheets, the default of one bank 
generating an immediate loss to all its unsecured creditors. Both emphasize that the structure of 
payments,  with  more  or  less  diversification  or  more  or  less  relationship  lending  will  be  a  key 
characteristic of the resilience of the banking system. Yet, from a policy point of view the two 
models have a crucial difference. In Allen and Gale any CB emergency liquidity injection allows 
solving the crisis no matter where the liquidity is injected, as it is profitable for one liquidity long 
institution  to  lend  to  a  liquidity  short  one.  In  FPR,  since  the  crisis  does  not  originate  in  an   10 
unpredicted  liquidity  shortage  but  in  a  rational  alternative  equilibrium  strategy  for  depositors, 
injecting additional cash in the aggregate will not help. Even in the case where every bank has 
access to sufficient liquidity, the inefficient gridlock equilibrium exists where banks resources are 
used in an inefficient way. Solving the crisis in the FPR model is more the resort of the bank 
regulatory authority than of the CB, as it requires guaranteeing that all claims on banks will be 
fulfilled. So, despite apparent similarities, the LOLR has a role of liquidity provider in the Allen-
Gale model, while it has a role of crisis manager in the FPR one.  
In a logic similar to the previous models another way in which the CB can prevent a crisis is 
to  reallocate  toward  the  correct  risk  the  liquidity  insurance  of  agents  particularly  sensitive  to 
extreme  events.  Caballero  and  Krishnamurthy  (2007)  construct  a  model  of  the  benefits  of  CB 
intervention during flight to quality episodes induced by such preferences. Agents deposit their 
wealth in financial intermediaries that insure them against shocks. Agents’ preferences however, do 
not exhibit the traditional risk aversion characteristics. Rather, agents are uncertainty-averse in the 
sense that they are uncertain about the functioning of the economy. This is modelled assuming that 
agents maximize the minimum expected utility that they receive. In other words they are extremely 
sensitive to extreme events. Extreme events are modelled as repeated waves of shocks that induce 
the agents to demand liquidity. Each agent is concerned about the scenario in which he is the last 
one to receive a shock and there is little liquidity left. Since they all have max-min preferences this 
induces an upward bias in the probability of the worst case scenario. When aggregate liquidity is 
insufficient agents waste valuable liquidity by self-insuring against worst case scenarios which are 
impossible.  
A CB with different preferences can improve matters. The CB has no more information than 
the private agents but just sees the world with a different lens, namely does not incorporate in its 
objective  function  the  worst-case  probability  assessments  of  the  private  agents.  Its  objective 
function allows seeing the world from the aggregate which makes it apparent that the worst case   11 
scenario that all agents are guarding against is impossible. Thus CB policy works by reducing the 
agents’ “anxiety” that they will receive a shock when liquidity is depleted. 
 
2.3 The LOLR and Liquidity shocks: the 9/11 case study. 
An important criticism on the classical view of the LOLR in today’s financial market has been 
raised by Goodfriend and King (1988). They argue that, the existence of a fully collateralized repo 
market allows CBs to provide the adequate  amount of liquidity which is then allocated by the 
interbank market. Since individual interventions would no longer be necessary the discount window 
is made obsolete. Well-informed participants to the interbank market are capable of distinguishing 
between illiquid and insolvent banks. These arguments have been so influential that the Bagehot 
view  of  the  LOLR  is  often  considered  obsolete  in  well  developed  financial  markets.  Yet, 
Goodfriend  and  King’s  argument  contradicts  the  asymmetric  information  assumption  that  is 
regarded as the main justification for financial intermediation. Goodfriend and King’s argument is 
even less attractive if we consider Goodhart’s (1987) criticism that liquidity and solvency shocks 
cannot be disentangled. 
Here we will begin with the analysis of the conduct of the LOLR in a particular instance that 
offers  a  clear  example  of  a  system-wide  liquidity  shock.  The  liquidity  effects  of  the  events  of 
September 11, 2001 illustrate well the systemic threats posed by the interdependencies in payment 
flows even in the absence of solvency shocks. McAndrews and Potter (2002) make the point that on 
September 11 banks experienced severe difficulties in making payments because of the widespread 
damage  to  the  payments  infrastructure.  The  nettable  nature  of  payment  flows  allows  banks  to 
operate in the Fedwire system with an amount of reserves which is about 1% of their total daily 
payments, with the rest coming from the inflows of payments from other banks.  This high velocity 
of circulation exposes the system to great risk if the normal coordination and synchronization of 
payments collapse as it happened on September 11. The events of that day resulted in an uneven 
distribution  of  liquidity  in  the  banking  system:  while  some  banks  unable  to  send  payments   12 
accumulated higher-than desired balances, other banks’ increased uncertainty about the flow of 
incoming payments led them to raise their precautionary demand for liquidity.  McAndrews and 
Potter (2002) observe that the incident that triggered the liquidity shortfall was well known to all 
market  participants  and  was  generally  perceived  as  a  pure  liquidity  shock,  unrelated  to  the 
fundamental solvency of any major financial institution.  However, the fear of a systemic threat due 
to  the  breakdown  of  the  coordination  mechanism  that  banks  use  in  their  normal  handling  of 
payment  flows  induced  the  Fed  to  act.  McAndrews  and  Potter  (2002)  and  Coleman  (2002) 
document that, on September 11 and in the following days the Fed took a number of steps to make 
sure that market participants would know that the Fed was ready to provide the liquidity that the 
market  demanded.    The  Fed  released  a  statement  encouraging  the  banks  to  borrow  from  the 
discount window with the result that discount loans grew  from $200  million to $45 billion on 
September 12; it waived daylight overdraft fees and overnight overdraft penalties so that overnight 
overdraft  increased  from  an  average  of  $9  million  in  August  2001  to  more  than  $4  billion  on 
September 12; later on, with markets beginning to function better the Fed increased liquidity in the 
interbank market via Open Market Operations (OMO) from $25 billion to $100 billion.  The Fed 
did not simply inject liquidity; it also invited the banks to benefit from the discount window by 
lifting the stigma that is usually attached to this type of borrowing. Still, it could be argued that, had 
all the operations been channelled through the open market, the effect would have been the same. If 
so, it would be impossible to see if the liquidity crisis was of the Allen and Gale type or of the FPR 
type.   
Nevertheless McAndrews and Potter (2002) point out another important lesson from these 
events that help discriminating between the two models. Banks that are reluctant to pay one another 
are also reluctant to lend one another. Thus in these circumstances injecting liquidity through OMO, 
as  advocated  for  example  by  Goodfriend  and  King  (1998)  may  be  ineffective  at  redistributing 
balances because the additional funds may not be circulated where needed, contrary to discount   13 
window interventions. Only once coordination among banks has been re-established OMO may be 
preferred as they leave to the market the task to allocate liquidity. 
That lending to the market via OMO may not be completely effective if banks are reluctant 
to lend to each other as they fear hidden losses in their counterparts balance sheets has been quite 
evident during the subprime crisis in the Summer of 2007.  So, the subprime crisis is directly related 
to the solvency issue while the events of September 11 were the result of a pure liquidity shock.  
 To  reinforce  the  previous  point  notice  that  the  response  of  the  Fed  to  the  events  of 
September 11, 2001 was facilitated by the fortuitous circumstance that the US banking system was 
in a relatively healthy condition at the onset of the crisis so that the Fed did not have to be selective 
about the account holders through which to channel reserves. Rather the Fed could lend freely to 
solvent banks according to the LOLR principles articulated by Bagehot, consistent with one of the 
missions of the Federal Reserve Act: “to furnish an elastic currency” (Lacker, 2004).  
 
2.4 Private LOLR  
Although  central  banks  and  their  LOLR  functions  are  relatively  new  institutions,  the  financial 
history of the US before the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1907 offers good examples 
of private arrangements to solve bank crises, namely the Commercial Bank Clearinghouses (CBCs) 
(See Gorton, 1985, and Gorton and Mullineaux, 1987 for a detailed analysis of CBCs). Originally 
developed to facilitate check clearance, the CBCs became organizations that performed a variety of 
tasks. During bank panics the CBC ceased to behave as an authority regulating competing banks 
and  instead  effectively  combined  the  member  banks  into  a  single  organization,  with  the  group 
accepting corporate liability for the debts of each individual member. Among the most significant 
actions of the CBC during a bank panic were the suspension of the publication of individual banks 
balance  sheet  and  the  publication  instead  of  aggregate  balance  sheet  information  for  the 
clearinghouse  as  a  whole,  the  suspension  of  convertibility  of  deposits  into  currency,  and  the 
issuance of loan certificates. Loan certificates were liabilities of the clearinghouse that member   14 
banks could use in the clearing process and could circulate as currency. These loan certificates, 
issued up to a fraction of the market value of the assets of the member bank seeking them, were in 
effect fiat money of the clearinghouse. 
  In the US, cooperation among banks produced stable interbank relationships, which in the 
case  of  the  Suffolk  system  -  an  important  example  of  a  self-regulating  bank  clearing  system 
operating throughout New England from the 1820s through the 1850s - were even more resilient 
than anticipated by their proponents (Calomiris, Khan, Kroszner, 1996). Many observers pointed 
out that the Federal Reserve System was a development of the existing CBCs (White, 1983, Gorton, 
1985, Calomiris, Kahn, Kroszner, 1996, and Timberlake, 1978, 1993). However, one criticism of 
the functioning of the CBCs, was that their membership criteria were too stringent and designed to 
reflect only the interest of the member banks, not the public interest. For example the New York 
Clearing House Association demanded a very high level of reserves to qualify for membership so 
that many banks preferred to opt out of the clearing system (Sprague 1910).  In the panic of 1907, a 
solvent Trust Company, the Knickerbocker Trust - which did not belong to any CBC - was forced 
to suspend as a result of liquidity problems. As argued by Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p.159) 
“Had  the  Knickerbocker  been  a  member  of  the  Clearing  House,  it  probably  would  have  been 
helped, and further crisis developments might thereby have been prevented.” The consequence was 
one of the severest contractions in US economic history, and the impetus for the founding of the 
Federal Reserve System. 
The  example  of  the  US  CBCs  shows  that  the  financial  linkages  that  expose  banks  to 
contagion threats may allow agents to obtain ex post mutual insurance in the form of private bail 
outs even though formal ex ante commitments are impossible.  A recent study by Leitner (2005) 
provides  a  model  that  shows  that  linkages  that  create  the  threat  of  contagion  may  be  optimal. 
Assume that the project of an agent can succeed only if he and the other agents whom he is linked 
to make a minimum level of investment. Since an agent’s endowment is random he may not have 
enough resources to make the necessary investment. His inability to commit to repay may prevent   15 
him from borrowing against future cash flow or from entering an insurance contract ex ante. In the 
absence of contagion through financial linkages, agents with high endowments have no incentives 
ex post to lend to agents with low endowments; hence some positive net present value projects are 
not realized. But if agents are linked to one another, then those with high endowments have the 
incentive  to  bail  out  those  with  low  endowments,  because  if  they  don’t,  all  projects  fail  by 
contagion. Financial linkages, thus, can motivate banks to help one another even in cases in which 
they could not commit to do so ex ante. The consolidation of the balance sheets of the member 
banks  of  the  CBC  in  crisis  time,  and  the  issuance  of  loan  certificates  drawn  on  the  CBC,  by 
providing ex post mutual insurance, seem to have performed privately modern LOLR functions. 
So, the evidence seems to indicate that, as expected, CBCs are more concerned about their 
own narrow interest than about the risk of contagion that may result from the bankruptcy of a bank 
outside their network. This is why a LOLR should have a mandate of preserving financial stability 
and should therefore encompass all banks not just the ones affiliated with its network. The question 
of semi-public institutions has not been the object of much research. Yet, during the subprime crisis 
of 2007 it has been argued that the Federal Home Loan Banks have massively lent to the banking 
industry and, by so doing, avoided an exacerbation of the mortgage crisis.
2 
 
3. Pure solvency contagion: the domino effect. 
Although it is clear that systemic risk increases in situations of financial fragility, the issue of 
contagion is characteristic of the banking industry. The “domino effect” is the evocative term used 
to illustrate it, and with good reason. Banks are related to one another through a network of assets 
and  liabilities,  and  a  joint  reputation.  When  considering  the  cost-benefit  of  a  LOLR  operation, 
contagion and systemic risk will be the first factors to be considered. Central banks have been clear 
                                                 
2 “FHLB advances rather than borrowing from the discount window reflects several factors: 1) the 
lower cost of FHLB advances, 2) the ability to borrow at longer terms from the FHLB, and 3) the 
lack of stigma in using FHLB advances as a source of funding.” William Dudley, Executive Vice-
President of the New York Fed, October 17, 2007, “May You Live in Interesting Times”.   16 
in asserting that they will bail out banks that are systemic, thus comforting the market prevailing 
view that banks are not equally treated, as some banks are too-big-to-fail. The important issue is 
here to assess whether contagion is a myth or a reality. 
From that perspective, it is important to start by reviewing the literature on contagion, and 
then point out some issues that affect the measure of contagion. Since the prevention of systemic 
risk  is  one  of  the  main  rationales  behind  the  LOLR  it  is  important  to  assess  and  quantify  it. 
Unfortunately  lack  of  data  availability  has  limited  so  far  the  analysis.    Researchers  have  thus 
resorted to study particular market segments or made particular assumptions about bilateral banks’ 
exposures, and have concentrated on specific countries. Typically they take as given the failure of a 
bank  and  track  its  effects  in  the  banking  system.  Although  no  general  conclusions  arise,  most 
studies  show  that  the  failure  of  one  bank  may  have  significant  knock-on  effects  on  others, 
depending on the architecture of the interbank links, the concentration of the banking industry, the 
extent of cross-border banking, and the presence of de facto safety nets.  
 
3. 1 Computing cross-banks contagion 
Humphrey  (1986)  was  the  first  to  investigate  the  extent  of  contagion  by  using  data  from  the 
Clearinghouse  Interbank  Payments  System  (CHIPS).  His  simulation  of  the  failure  of  a  major 
participant in the payment system showed that this could lead to a cascading effect. More recently, 
estimates of contagion in the US federal funds market were obtained by Furfine (2003) that studied 
the particular segment of settlement data to compute bilateral exposures in the US federal funds 
market. He found that contagion is quite limited: even in the worst case scenario of the failure of the 
largest bank with a 40% loss given default, only between 2 and 6 banks fail with 0.8% of total bank 
assets involved. Since his data incorporate only federal funds transactions which account only for 
10-20%  of  total  interbank  exposures  the  estimates  of  contagion  are  potentially  conservative. 
However, illiquidity presents a greater threat: if a large federal funds debtor becomes unable to   17 
borrow, illiquidity could spread to banks representing almost 9% of the US banking system by 
assets. 
Studies  conducted  for  smaller  economies  and,  or  with  a  bigger  size  of  cross-border 
transactions show a more pronounced risk of systemic repercussions.  In particular Blavarg and 
Nimander (2002) study the impact that the failure of one of the top 4 largest Swedish banks may 
have on the rest of the system. They find that such a failure could push Tier 1 capital of the three 
other banks below 4% and hence force their closure. An even more dramatic effect could result 
from the failure of the largest foreign counterparty. 
Wells (2004) and Upper and Worms (2004) use a similar methodology to study contagion 
starting  with  estimates  of  the  matrix  of  bilateral  exposures  of  banks  in  the  interbank  market. 
However, since one can only observe each bank’s total interbank claims and liabilities, it is not 
possible to estimate such a matrix without imposing further restrictions. Their approach is to choose 
a distribution that maximises the uncertainty (the “entropy”) of these exposures. The result is that 
these exposures reflect the relative importance of each institution in the interbank market via the 
size of its total borrowing and lending. With this methodology Wells (2004) studies the effect of the 
sudden and unexpected insolvency of a single bank in the UK. He shows that this can lead to a 
substantial weakening in the capital holdings of other banks, but in most cases does not result in 
additional bank failures. By assuming complete loss given default, his model shows that, in the 
extreme cases, single bank insolvency could trigger knock-on effects leading in the worst case to 
the failure of up to one quarter of the UK banking system. At the same time, a further quarter of the 
banking system would suffer losses amounting to more than 10% of their Tier 1 capital. For loss 
given default levels of less than 50%, contagion affects, at worst, less than 1% of total banking 
system  assets.  However,  even  with  low  losses  given  default,  a  narrow  shock  can  considerably 
reduce the capital reserves of many banks. Furthermore, if the initial shocks hit during a period 
where the banking system is already weakened (e.g. during a recession), the effect of contagion can 
be more pronounced.    18 
Upper and Worms (2004) use German banks balance sheet information to estimate a matrix 
of bilateral credit exposures. They find that interbank lending is relatively concentrated and, as the 
theoretical literature suggests (Allen and Gale, 2000, and FPR, 2000) this makes contagion a real 
possibility. Despite the presence of institutional guarantees that prevent the failure of the savings 
and cooperative banks sector, there is considerable scope for contagion as the failure of a single 
bank could led to a break down of up to 15% of the banking system in terms of assets.    
 
3.2 Changing patterns in cross-bank contagion  
Lack of data availability has forced previous researchers to conduct simulations based on bilateral 
exposures on a short period of time, while contagion risk has evolved over time as function of 
banking consolidation and the increased importance of cross-border banking. The availability of 
detailed confidential bank balance sheet data about Belgium allows Degryse and Nguyen (2006) to 
go  beyond  the  existing  literature  on  several  respects.  First  using  time  series  data  on  interbank 
exposures they examine the evolution over time of the contagion risk associated with the failure of a 
Belgian bank. Second, they conduct a regression analysis that identifies the major determinants of 
contagion. They find that a move from a “complete” structure – one where each bank lends to each 
other - towards a “multiple money centers” bank structure and the increase in concentration in the 
lending market decrease domestic contagion. They also find that an increase in the proportion of 
cross border assets decreases the risk and the impact of domestic contagion. These results contrast 
with those of Mistrulli (2005) for the Italian interbank market. He finds that the importance of 
cross-border exposures has decreased and that the transition from a “complete” toward a “multiple 
money  centers”  structure  has  increased  contagion  risk.  Part  of  the  contrasting  results  can  be 
attributed to the different methodologies, as the Mistrulli’s study is based on simulations while 
Degryse  and  Nguyen  use  regression  analysis  which  allows  sorting  out  the  different  sources  of 
contagion. 
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3.3 An alternative approach 
The exposure of the LOLR to systemic risk can be quantified using standard risk management 
techniques  that  take  into  account  the  correlations  between  banks  assets  portfolios.  While  most 
studies take the probability of default as given and trace the impact of a bank default on the rest of 
the system, a new methodology proposed by  Lehar (2005) allows estimating the probability of 
default and pricing the liabilities of the regulators with respect to the banks as contingent claims in 
the classic framework of Merton (1977).  Assuming that bank assets values follows a geometric 
Brownian motion one can link equity price, asset values, and bank debt in a standard equation that 
sees equity (whose price is observable from the market) as a call option on bank’s assets with a 
strike price equal to the notional value of bank debt (observable from the banks’ balance sheet). 
Using a maximum likelihood estimation procedure the value of the banks’ assets is then obtained 
and the exposure of the regulator computed. Lehar (2005) uses a sample of 149 international banks 
from 1988 to 2002 to identify the banks with the highest contributions to systemic risk and the 
countries which threaten the stability of the global financial system. Correlations of North American 
banks asset portfolios have increased but the systemic risk of the North American banking system 
has decreased over time as banks have increased their capitalization. Instead, the capitalization of 
the Japanese banks has declined dramatically causing that system to become very unstable. Not 
surprisingly the estimated regulator’s liabilities increased sharply at the time of the Asian crisis in 
1997/98. 
 
3.4 Is contagion a myth? 
On the basis of the previous estimates, one might be tempted to conclude that contagion is a myth. 
The exposures of banks one to another are limited and should not be  a major concern for the 
regulator. But taking the estimates at their face value without considering the whole contributions 
that the theoretical models allow us to make would be an oversimplified view of contagion. From 
this  point  of  view,  at  least  three  important  criticisms  should  be  formulated.  They  concern  the   20 
indirect contagion through the behaviour of depositors, the business cycle, the price of bank assets 
during a crisis and the impact of liquidity. 
First, the empirical evidence is based on the network of banks assets and liabilities. Still, it 
may well be the case that the failure of one bank implies contagion through demand depositors. 
Their rational updating of the chances of another bank of similar characteristics may lead them to 
withdraw their deposits in a fly for quality. Many banking crises illustrate this phenomenon, as 
during the Great Depression in the US, or in the ethnic bank crisis in the aftermath of the Bank of 
Credit  and  Commerce  International  in  the  UK.  The  default  of  the  Madhavpura  Mercantile 
Cooperative Bank in India in 2001 was used as a case study by Iyer and Peydro (2006) to examine 
the contagion taking place through demand deposits. Still, the overall analysis of the joint impact of 
a bank failure through the network of reciprocal liabilities and through depositor’s reaction remains 
to be done. 
The second remark is that the measure of contagion is different in good times and in bad 
times. The impact of an individual bank when the banking system is healthy is the object of the 
above  analysis. Yet from the policy  analysis point of view, it is not clear that this is the best 
measure of contagion. An individual bank is more likely to go bankrupt when all banks are in 
trouble. This, of course, makes the analysis much complex, because in such a case, contagion-
induced  and  macroeconomic-induced  systemic  risk  are  simply  undistinguishable.  So,  the  new 
challenge  in  the  measurement  of  contagion  would  be  to  try  to  compute  the  impact  of  a  bank 
bankruptcy conditionally on the banking sector health, using some measure of the loan impairment 
in the banks’ loan portfolio. 
A third remark is the impact of a number of bank failures on the value of assets.  The main 
impact,  first  identified  by  Irving  Fisher  (1933),  concerns  the  price  of  assets  that  are  used  as 
collateral. In a debt-deflation situation, the value of assets decreases and this lowers the amount of 
collateralized loans, and therefore the amount of available credit, which, in turn, reduces output. 
This output declines will again impact into the price of assets, thus leading to a further reduction in   21 
asset prices until outside investors buy the assets (see also Kyotaki and Moore, 1997 and, more 
recently, Gorton and Huang, 2004, and Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007).  
Finally, and more tentatively, the cross-banks link could be underestimated as well if we 
restrict the analysis to solvency. In fact, a bank lending overnight to a peer financial institution that 
happens to be in default may not be fully satisfied with the knowledge that it will recover 95% of its 
claims in five years, after the liquidation of the failing institution is complete. This may trigger the 
lending bank to liquidate some of its assets later at “fire sale”, possibly increasing the impact on the 
price of assets.  
Recently the possibility of contagion from the asset side of interlinked balance sheets has 
received explicit attention in the literature. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) examine the efficient 
closure/bail-out policies and find out that if the number of banks facing distress is large enough, it 
may be ex-post optimal for the regulator to bail out some failed banks or alternatively to provide 
liquidity assistance to surviving banks in the purchase of failed banks. In both cases, the LOLR has 
to step in, as in Allen and Gale (2000) or FPR (2000). Schnabel and Shin (2004) and Cifuentes, 
Shin,  and  Ferrucci  (2005)  show  that  changes  in  asset  prices  may  interact  with  solvency 
requirements  or  with  internal  risk  control  and  amplify  the  initial  shock.  The  idea  is  that  the 
reduction of the value of a bank’s balance sheet may force the sale of assets or the disposal of a 
trading position. If the assets market is not perfectly elastic, the sale of assets will induce a further 
decline in asset value which might outweigh the initial shock. The awareness of this risk is linked to 
a number of steps taken by the regulators to soften liquidity requirements in the face of crisis. Thus, 
for  instance,  the  Financial  Services  Authority  responded  to  the  decline  in  stock  prices  in  the 
Summer  2002  by  diluting  the  solvency  test  for  insurance  companies  and  in  1998  the  Fed 
orchestrated the rescue of the hedge fund LTCM to prevent the negative impact of asset values that 
would have resulted from the unwinding of its positions. 
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4. Distinguishing between insolvent and illiquid banks 
The difficulty to distinguish between an illiquid and an insolvent bank has been acknowledged at 
least since Bagehot’s Lombard Street, when he argued “Every banker knows that if he has to prove 
that  he  is  worthy  of  credit,  however  good  may  be  his  arguments,  in  fact  his  credit  is  gone”. 
Modeling such a framework has been done only recently. Two different approaches are possible, 
one based on unobservable liquidity and solvency shocks and the other based on the coordination of 
interbank market lenders’ strategic responses to fundamental, public and private, solvency signals. 
 
4.1 Unidentifiable shocks 
The difficulty of sorting out liquidity and solvency shocks stems also from the unique position that 
banks have in creating aggregate liquidity. Diamond and Rajan (2005) - building on their previous 
work (Diamond and Rajan, 2001) - argue that banks perform two complementary functions: they 
have loan collection skills without which borrowers could not credibly commit to repay their loans, 
and they issue demand deposits to commit not to extract rents from investors. If a sufficiently large 
fraction of banks’ portfolio needs refinancing (a solvency problem) the bank will be unable to 
borrow against its future value. But in that case there will be a shortage of liquidity in the economy 
to fund current consumption (a liquidity problem). A solvency problem or a liquidity problem alone 
can lead to a run on a bank if depositors anticipate losses. A run, in turn, destroys a bank’s ability to 
extract money from borrowers and thus the ability to channel funds from surplus agents to those in 
need to consume. Thus after a run aggregate liquidity is destroyed (an effect not present in bank 
runs of the type of Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) and liquidity is also trapped in the wrong place; 
hence the difficulty of distinguishing between illiquid and insolvent banks. The appropriate policy 
response  depends  on  the  cause  of  the  problem.  When  the  source  of  the  problem  is  a  liquidity 
shortage Diamond and Rajan (2005) advocate to lend freely to prevent a drop in the money stock.  
When solvency is the problem their advice is to recapitalize banks. Recapitalization, however, can 
be harmful if the problem is lack of liquidity since capital infusion will simply push interest rates up   23 
potentially causing more bank failures. Liquidity infusion instead has the least downside and thus it 
fits the test of doing no harm.  
The approach followed by Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (FPR) (2004) is also based on the 
impossibility of distinguishing illiquidity from insolvency. In their paper they consider that banks 
are confronted with shocks that may come from uncertain withdrawals by impatient consumers 
(liquidity shocks) or from losses on the long term investments that they have financed (solvency 
shocks) and that the two types of shocks cannot be disentangled. In acting as a LOLR the CB faces 
the  possibility  that  an  insolvent  bank  may  pose  as  an  illiquid  one  and  borrow  either  from  the 
interbank market or form the CB itself. Then the bank may “gamble for resurrection”, that is, it may 
invest the loan in the continuation of a project with a negative expected net present value.  This 
assumption is in line with the criticism of the LOLR during the S&L crisis in the US during the 
eighties and justifies why CBs are reluctant to be more liberal in their use of ELA. This setting 
allows the authors to focus both on the incentive issues of ELA and under which macroeconomic 
conditions the CB should provide ELA, at the cost of abstracting from modelling contagion. In 
periods of crisis, when banks’ assets are very risky, borrowing in the interbank market may impose 
a high penalty because of the high spread demanded on loans. FPR (2004) show that ELA should be 
made at a penalty rate so as to discourage insolvent banks from borrowing as if they were illiquid, 
but it should happen at a rate lower than the interbank market. The reason the CB can lend at better 
rate than the market is that the CB can lend collateralized and thus override the priority of existing 
claims.  By  penalizing  insolvent  banks  that  demand  ELA,  the  CB  provides  banks  with  the 
appropriate incentives to exert effort to limit the probability that a bank becomes insolvent in the 
first place. 
The  implications  of  this  approach  can  be  clearly  seen  in  the  assessment  of  the  2007 
international turmoil. The classical view of the interbank market, according to which the interbank 
market works perfectly, was that the spreads on interbank loans were understating risk, and that the 
observed turmoil was a correction in pricing on all assets and contracts that depended on the price   24 
of risk: real estate, mortgages and unsecured loans to banks.  Instead, the FPR (2004) approach 
views  the  crisis  as  a  joint  one  of  liquidity  and  solvency,  so  that,  absent  CB  intervention,  the 
interbank  market  may  exacerbate  the  adverse  selection  problems.  Taking  the  argument  to  the 
extreme, as modelled, for instance, in Freixas and Holthausen (2005) or Freixas and Jorge (2007), 
this  may  lead  to  a  thin  market  equilibrium  as  in  the  classical  market  for  lemons.  The  policy 
implications are vital, since if the differential diagnostic is a correction back to the long term price 
of risk, the optimal policy may be for the CB not to intervene except in so far as to reduce the cost 
of banks failure. If, instead, adverse selection in the interbank market leads to a stand still, then the 
LOLR liquidity provision to individual institutions is capital.   
 
4.2 The global games approach   
Rochet  and  Vives  (2004)  provides  a  theoretical  foundation  of  Bagehot’s  doctrine  in  a  modern 
context. They shift the  emphasis from maturity transformation  and liquidity insurance of small 
depositors to the modern form of bank runs where large well informed depositors refuse to renew 
their credits in the interbank market.  Building on the theory of global games they investigate the 
optimal behavior of bankers that observe noisy signals about banks’ fundamentals. This allows 
obtaining a unique equilibrium, in contrast with the Diamond-Dybvig classical result. The global 
games approach overcomes the problem of equilibrium selection (Carlsson and Van Damme, 1993, 
and  Morris  and  Shin,  1998)  by  linking  the  probability  of  occurrence  of  a  crisis  to  both  the 
fundamentals and the information of depositors. The proof of uniqueness of the equilibrium hinges 
of the assumption of global strategic complementarities, namely an agent’s incentive to take an 
action increases monotonically with the number of agents who take the same action.  Rochet and 
Vives (2004), Dasgupta (2004), Goldstein and Pauzner (2004), and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), 
show the theoretical possibility of a solvent bank failing because agents withdraw their investments 
for fearing that others will. All these papers show that the introduction of noisy signals to multiple-
equilibria  games  may  lead  to  a  unique  equilibrium.  Since  the  signals  are  noisy,  even  a  small   25 
asymmetry of information can lead to strategic uncertainty about the other agents’ actions.  This 
prevents the agents from coordinating their actions and reduces the set of possible equilibria. These 
models are panic based, that is, driven by bad expectations: depositors want to withdraw early 
because on the basis of their signal they fear that a sufficiently large number of other agents will 
withdraw.  The  beliefs  of  the  investors  are  uniquely  determined  by  the  realization  of  the 
fundamentals in the sense that the fundamentals serve as a device coordinating agents’ beliefs on a 
particular equilibrium. This approach allows reconciling two seemingly different views of banks 
runs: runs originated by negative real shocks, and runs originated by coordination failures. 
Rochet and Vives (2004) apply this approach to the interbank market where, as a result of 
the signal a fraction of bankers decide to withdraw from other banks. A banker withdraws if and 
only if the probability of failure of the bank, conditional on the signal and the behavior of the other 
bankers, is large enough. This leads to the following equilibrium: if the signal about returns is poor 
bank failures are caused by insolvency; but if the signal about returns is good failures caused by 
illiquidity may still occur if many other bankers withdraw.  The uniqueness of equilibrium and the 
fact  that  it  is  based  on  bank  fundamentals  allow  Rochet  and  Vives  (2004)  to  develop  policy 
recommendations. Even if liquidity and solvency regulation can solve the coordination problem, 
Rochet and Vives (2004) show that the cost in terms of foregone investment is too large. Thus 
prudential measures must be complemented with LOLR interventions. CB interventions can be in 
the form of OMOs that lower the need to fire sale bank assets, or discount window lending. If the 
fire  sale  premium  is  high  because  of  temporary  liquidity  crises  then  OMO  may  be  preferred.  
Discount windows interventions may be instead preferred if the fire sale premium is thought to 
originate from an adverse selection problem. In either case the LOLR lending should be at below 
market rate in contrast with Bagehot’s doctrine of lending at a penalty rate. 
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5. Efficiency, regulators objective function, and decentralization 
Although the characterisation of the optimal LOLR policy, as we have derived it in the previous 
section, brings a number of important insights, its implementation might be confronted with serious 
difficulties. First, the objective function of the regulator may be biased, not reflecting the correct 
values for the social costs and benefits of the continuation vs. liquidation decision. Second, the 
regulatory structure may be decentralized and therefore will combine decisions of two or more 
institutions  with  different  objective  functions.
3  This  decentralization  may  take  different  forms, 
depending on whether it is within a country, where a CB and a Deposit Insurance Company have to 
coordinate  their  policies,  between  monetary  authorities  and  institutions  in  charge  of  prudential 
regulation (as the FSA in the UK), or between several countries as it is the case for multinational 
banks. 
 
5.1 A unique regulator 
In order to analyse the bias in the regulator’s objective function, consider first, as a benchmark, the 
decision of the regulator in the absence of a liquidity shortage. A distinction parallel to the one that 
is drawn regarding the autonomy of Central Banks may be here useful (Lybeck and Morris, 2004).  
A regulator is entrusted with Goal autonomy if it has the power to determine its primary objective 
from several objectives; it is entrusted with Target autonomy only if it has autonomy over one 
clearly defined primary objective, usually stipulated in the law.  Absent moral hazard on behalf of 
the  regulator,  goal  autonomy  is  preferred  to  target  autonomy,  because  unrestricted  welfare 
maximization obviously dominates the maximization of other objective functions. This could be the 
result of a tendency for the regulator to overestimate the cost of a liquidation or the benefits of the 
continuation, or more likely, could be the consequence of an incorrect objective function for the 
regulator in terms of its career, compensation and reputation, which, as stated in the classical Stigler   27 
(1971) and Peltzman (1976) “capture theory”, might lead to collusion between regulator and the 
regulated bank.   
Consequently,  the  effective  comparison  is  not  between  restricted  and  unrestricted  unbiased 
regulatory policies, but, rather between two second best policies:  cost minimization, as a form of 
target  autonomy,  and  welfare  maximization,  within  a  goal  autonomy  which  is  open  to  the 
regulator’s  discretionary  interpretation  and  is,  therefore,  more  sensitive  to  the  biases  in  the 
regulator’s objective function. In the US, the first approach has been selected: the regulatory choice 
has been to tie the regulator’s hands by giving him a precise mandate of cost minimization.  
Restricting the analysis to cost minimisation implies that the regulator’s objective function is 
biased. This bias arises from the very fact that prudential regulation is concerned with downside risk 
only  and  disregards  the  upside  potential  for  profits  that  the  continuation  policy  may  involve. 
Because of this, the cost minimizing LOLR will always be biased towards liquidation (Kahn and 
Santos, 2005). On the other hand, the regulator’s own objective function may be biased towards 
overestimating the cost of liquidation and underestimating the cost of continuation and this will go 
in the opposite direction. In what follows we will survey the main results in the literature that makes 
the  assumption  of  cost  minimization.  In  the  case  of  decentralization,  this  will  imply  that  each 
regulator will consider only the costs that it has to bear, and not the total social cost. 
A precision is here in order regarding the legal context. Although theoretically the regulator’s 
mandate gives him the power to remove management and close down the bank, it may provide 
these options at very high costs (e.g. years of litigation) that the regulator may want to avoid. Two 
cases have to be considered: either these costs are limited and the regulator has the power to close 
down the bank independently of the liquidation shortage, or else, it is only when the bank is forced 
to resort to the LOLR that the regulator is able to decide whether the bank should be granted access 
                                                                                                                                                                  
3 Note that while the issue of the interplay between different regulatory instruments, as, for instance 
deposit insurance and banking supervision has been extensively examined, the interplay between 
different regulators has only recently been considered.   28 
to the LOLR facilities (and therefore will be able to continue its activity), or whether it should be 
denied it, in which case it would be closed down.  
The case where the closure decision is to be taken in connection with a LOLR operation can be 
viewed, from a theoretical perspective, as the case where the regulator observes a non verifiable 
signal in a context where, for legal reasons, the decision to close down the bank cannot be based 
upon a  non-verifiable signal.
4 A bank faced with a liquidity shortage the interbank market that is 
not ready to cover, is forced to leave the continuation vs. closure decision in the hands of the CB. 
The lack of liquidity support from their peers, and the absence of liquid securities to pledge or sell 
also provide additional information that will allow the LOLR to update its information.  
  
5.2 Multiple domestic regulators 
Decentralization  between  deposit  insurance  and  LOLR  has  been  initially  analyzed  by  Repullo 
(2000)  and  then  by  Kahn  and  Santos  (2005).  With  the  trends  towards  the  externalization  of 
supervision and banking regulation outside the CB, for instance in the hands of a Financial Services 
Authority, this issue is highly topical. From a theoretical point of view, the coordination of the two 
institutions should not be a problem as the two regulators compensation package could be optimally 
determined. Yet, in practice this is a clear issue, as both institutions may have different views 
regarding the costs and benefits of a loan to the defaulting institution. Although the total cost of a 
bank failure, whether cost of liquidation or reputation cost to the regulators could be shared, the 
positions regarding the effect of a loan are quite different and affect each institution incentives to 
intervene to rescue or to liquidate a defaulting institution. For the CB, the cost of granting a loan is 
the amount of the loan, because, in the event of failure, part of the cost will be borne by the deposit 
insurance. On the other hand, from the point of view of the Deposit Insurance Company, the issue is 
                                                 
4 Casual observation seems to indicate that regulatory authorities are quite reluctant to enter into a 
legal battle with a commercial bank that might end as a Pyrrhic victory.  The case of BCCI where 
the Bank of England waited for almost a year before accumulating sufficient evidence of fraud prior 
to the coordinated closure of the institution across the world in July 1991 illustrates this point.   29 
continuation or liquidation rather than the cost of extending credit. This is so because the Deposit 
Insurance Company will take into account the cost of reimbursing all the insured deposits, not just 
the cost of the loan loss. As a consequence, both institutions may have opposite biases: the deposit 
insurance may be excessively prone to liquidation, because, as explained in the unique regulator 
case the regulator considers only downside risks, while the CB, not bearing the full cost of paying 
back insured depositors may be bent towards continuation. 
The allocation of power between the two regulators as well as their incentives will be capital in 
determining the type of LOLR policy. This issue might have played a key role in the Northern Rock 
crisis, and will therefore be at the forefront of the regulatory analysis in the forthcoming years. Two 
cases are to be considered depending on whether the agreement of the two institutions is necessary, 
or whether the allocation of the authority to close down a bank depends upon the extent of the 
liquidity shortage. 
 
Functional specialization  
When the mandates of the two regulatory agencies are clearly differentiated, the CB specializes in 
last resort lending while the Deposit Insurance Company is in charge of the continuation vs. closure 
decision. In this case, the two regulatory institutions have to agree on continuation, as otherwise the 
bank is closed down. In other words, a bank may be closed down either by the deposit insurance 
because of the signal on the bank future profitability, or else by the CB because of the excessive 
cost of the LOLR operation. So, because each regulator has a veto power, the joint decision reduces 
the forbearance problem (Kahn and Santos, 2005). Note that, again, the deposit insurance decision 
to close down the bank is biased towards excessive liquidation because it does not internalise the 
upper tail of the bank’s profit, while the CB decision is also biased because the cost of a loan 
depends on its size; so for small loans the CB is prone to forbearance while for large ones it has a 
bias towards excessive liquidation that is even bigger than the Deposit Insurance Company’s one.    30 
So, at high levels of illiquidity, the CB may refuse to lend despite the good signal the deposit 
insurance company receives on the bank’s future profitability.  
 
Regulatory powers allocated depending on the size of the liquidity shortage 
Repullo  (2000)  considers  an  incomplete  contract  approach  where  both  the  CB  and  the  deposit 
insurance are able to observe the same unverifiable signal on the bank future profitability, but where 
the right to act as the LOLR and therefore to take the decision as to whether the liquidity short bank 
should continue or should be closed down depends upon a verifiable variable, the amount of the 
required loan.   
The main result of Repullo is that, if the CB is a junior creditor with respect to the deposit 
insurance, and if it lends at a zero interest rate, then it is optimal to allocate control to the CB when 
withdrawals are small and to the Deposit Insurance Company when they are large. As before, the 
intuition is based on the biases of the two regulatory institutions. For small loans the CB’s decisions 
are closer to the optimal ones while for larger amounts, the Deposit Insurance Company’s decisions 
are preferred. Contingent allocation on the basis of the realised liquidity needs lead, therefore, to an 
improvement with respect to the case where a unique regulator is in charge.  
 
Extending the framework 
Both Repullo (2000) and Kahn and Santos (2005) assume that the LOLR is a junior creditor. The 
reason for making this assumption is not that this is the most common structure, as frequently the 
CB is senior. The reason is simply that, if the CB has a senior claim and is certain to always recover 
the full amount of its loan, it has an incentive to systematically forbear. Thus, from a theoretical 
perspective, the issue of whether the loan should be collateralized or not, or, the closely related one 
of whether the CB should be senior is trivial: it reduces the cost of LOLR operations and therefore 
increases the tendency to forbearance.    31 
If there is a unique regulator, the regulator internalizes the cost that this generates on the deposit 
insurance company. This will then have an impact on uninsured claim holders that will see their 
probability of recovering the whole amount of their claim increase, while, at the same time, they 
will be confronted with a larger loss given default in case of liquidation. On the other hand, if the 
regulator  is  not  unique,  its  seniority  rights,  or  its  use  of  collateralized  loans  will  generate  an 
externality on the deposit insurance fund. The LOLR operations will not be decided based on the 
real cost, but on the fraction of the cost that the CB incurs and this will lead to even a larger bias 
towards forbearance.  
The functional specialization can be pushed one step forward if the Treasury is guaranteeing the 
loan of the CB to the illiquid (and may be insolvent) bank. In this case, the cost to the CB is only 
reputational. Such a scheme would parallel the one existing in the UK with the Bank of England 
lending with the guarantee of the Treasury. The mechanism has been used on September 17
th and 
then again on October 9
th , 2007 to guarantee all the deposits at Northern Rock. The Repullo-Kahn-
Santos approach predicts a CB that would be prone to excessive leniency. 
In  practice,  we  observe  that  CBs  are  quite  reluctant  to  lend  to  financial  institutions  except 
against good collateral, thus following Bagehot’s principles.  Both the US Federal Reserve Discount 
Window and the ECB marginal lending facility operate on the basis of collateralized lending. Still 
there is a crucial difference between them: the ECB marginal lending facility collateral is based on 
securities traded in financial markets.  So, it appears to be a substitute for a repo market with 
insufficient liquidity.  On the other hand, under section 10B of the Federal Reserve Act, Reserve 
Banks can accept any assets satisfactory to them as collateral for discount window advances.
5  So, 
the discount window mechanism cannot be considered a substitute for the repo market and allows to 
extent a larger amount of loans, possibly depriving the Deposit Insurance Company of valuable 
                                                 
5 The Federal Reserve currently accepts a wide variety of instruments as collateral under section 
10B, including customer notes, mortgages on one- to four-family homes, commercial real estate 
loans, credit card receivables, collateralized mortgage obligations, asset-backed securities, and a 
host of other common debt obligations (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2002).   32 
assets in case of the bank bankruptcy. The same is true of the European marginal lending facility, 
which is open to a wider range of collateral than the weekly Main Refinancing Operations auctions, 
even if lending at a penalty. 
 
Information Gathering and information sharing 
Up to now we have assumed both regulators were endowed with an informative signal regarding the 
future profitability of the banks projects. In fact, one of the two regulatory agencies may have the 
informative signal and the question is whether it has incentives to share it with the other one. Kahn 
and Santos (2006) consider this issue. They show that when only the CB has access to information 
about the bank future profitability, it has no incentive to transmit this information. The implication 
is that when the costs for the deposit insurance are prohibitively high, the optimal institutional 
mechanism is to allocate the liquidation vs. closure power to the CB for small liquidity shocks, and 
to always support the bank’s continuation for large liquidity shocks. 
Although this statement may seem a bit extreme, it might nevertheless prove useful in the 
understanding of the Northern Rock crisis in 2007.  The Bank of England considers that Northern 
Rock crisis is not systemic. Yet the market for liquidity dries. The FSA is in charge of solvency and 
issues a favourable report, confirming the “pure liquidity” assumption. The Bank of England cannot 
institute a mechanism similar to the ECB or to the discount window that allows for a much larger 
class of admissible collateral, and is therefore forced to resort to a special LOLR operation that 
guarantees all deposits. Without entering on the structure of deposit insurance in the UK or the fact 
that the actual terms and conditions of the credit facility are not public, the FSA had considered 
Northern Rock as following a safe banking strategy.
6 The Bank of England had to rely on this 
information when choosing to extend a credit line. The difficulty of the Bank of England to avoid 
been perceived as encouraging moral hazard by not resisting to the lobbies of the uninsured debt 
                                                 
6 On this it was not alone: Moody’s in April 2007 and Standard and Poor’s in August 2006 had 
raised Northern Rock rating by one notch.   33 
holders  is  clear  in  this  case.  Despite  previous  official  statement  to  the  contrary,  the  images  of 
depositors lined up to withdraw from Northern Rock branches in the end forced the UK authorities 
to guarantee all depositors. Since, at the same time the credit line is guaranteed by HM-Treasury, 
the incentives to find information contradicting the FSA are quite narrow. The Northern Rock case 
illustrates the notion that assuming that the monetary authorities can always commit not to save 
lenders from their excesses is not realistic even in a sophisticated financial system.
7 
 
Monetary policy and the LOLR 
One of the major achievements of theoretical and empirical research in the last two decades has 
been to establish that the independence of Central Banks in setting monetary policy is one of the 
conditions for economic stability. Still, when it comes to the independence of monetary policy and 
LOLR policy, the issue is more involved. To begin with, the LOLR policy is part of the safety net. 
So, a preliminary question would be to consider the pros and cons of having monetary policy and 
prudential regulation responsibilities delegated to two distinct institutions. The theoretical argument 
in favour of separation is the existence of possible conflicts of interest: as LOLR, the CB may feel 
compelled to bail out banks if this is necessary to prevent a systemic crisis. The conflict of interest 
is  all  the  more  serious  in  that  monetary  policy  is  countercyclical  while  prudential  policy  is 
procyclical, as bank bankruptcies occur in slowdowns (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1993). The 
                                                 
7 “The decision to authorise was made by the Chancellor on the basis of recommendations by the 
Governor  of  the  Bank  of  England  and  the  Chairman  of  the  Financial  Services  Authority  in 
accordance with the framework set out in the published Memorandum of Understanding between 
the Bank, FSA and HM Treasury.” News Release, Bank of England, September 14th 2007. The 
Governor of the Bank of England, in his letter to the Treasury Committee on 12 September 2007 
stated: “Central banks, in their traditional lender of last resort (LOLR) role, can lend “against good 
collateral at a penalty rate” to an individual bank facing temporary liquidity problems, but that is 
otherwise regarded as solvent. The rationale would be that the failure of such a bank would lead to 
serious economic damage, including to the customers of the bank. The moral hazard of an increase 
in  risk-taking  resulting  from  the  provision  of  LOLR  lending  is  reduced  by  making  liquidity 
available  only  at  a  penalty  rate.  Such  operations  in  this  country  are  covered  by  the  tripartite 
arrangements set out in the MOU between the Treasury, Financial Services Authority and the Bank 
of England. Because they are made to individual institutions, they are flexible with respect to type 
of collateral and term of the facility. LOLR operations remain in the armoury of all central banks.”   34 
cross-country empirical analysis of Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993 and 1995) establishes that 
central banks that have supervisory responsibilities experience higher inflation rates. On the other 
hand, Peek, Rosengren and Tootell (1999) empirical analysis show that information obtained from 
bank  supervision  helps  the  CB  to  conduct  monetary  policy  more  effectively.  More  recently, 
Ioannidou (2005) examining the behaviour of the three primary US federal regulators - the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the 
Federal Reserve Board - shows that indicators of monetary policy do affect actions of the Federal 
Reserve Board, while it does not affect those of the FDIC or the OCC. Now, when we consider 
LOLR operations, the impact on monetary policy could, theoretically, be sterilized.
8  So, when the 
bail out operation concerns an individual bank crisis, monetary policy should not be affected. Of 
course, when facing a generalized crisis, as in the case of the subprime crisis of 2007, the CB has to 
consider the impact of the banking crisis on expected growth and inflation patterns, and therefore is 
expected to intervene.
9  
In summary the empirical evidence indicates that whether the responsibilities of monetary 
policy and prudential regulation are joint or separated does affect the way they are implemented. 
Still, this does not tell us which of the two models, is more efficient.  
  An extreme version of the idea that the assets market is not perfectly elastic arises when not 
all assets can be used to purchase other assets. Gorton and Huang (2004) show that when there are 
such “liquidity-in-advance” constraints it is privately efficient for agents to hoard liquidity but it is 
not socially efficient given the opportunity cost of foregone investment opportunities. When the 
amount of the assets to be sold is so large that it would have been inefficient for private agents to 
have hoarded liquidity, the government can improve welfare by creating liquidity to bail out banks 
                                                 
8 Although, as noted by Goodhart and Huang (1999), the residual uncertainty on the precise amount 
of the bail-out operation may have a macroeconomic impact. 
9 The type of interventions we have witnessed on behalf of the Fed and of the ECB show a different 
conception of the role of monetary policy in its interaction with a banking crisis. In particular, the 
reaction to stock market movements on January 21
th and 22
nd 2008 reveal strikingly different views 
of the timing and frequency of money market interventions.   35 
by taxing solvent projects. The drawback is that if the government tax capacity is too small, the 
government cannot bail out all banks and forbearance arises. The link with monetary policy and the 
conflict of interest it implies is clear. Banking crises will materialize in a downturn, under a tight 
monetary  policy.  This  puts  pressure  on  the  prices  of  assets,  thus  setting  the  stage  for  a  debt-
deflation. If, simultaneously, the LOLR has to bail out banks in distress, there is a clear case for 
coordination of policies and weighting of the cost of a higher inflation versus the cost of banking 
crises. 
  
5.3 Multiple international regulators 
The previous analysis of multiple regulators can be extended to international regulatory bodies.  If 
regulators internalize correctly the costs of bankruptcy, the Repullo-Kahn-Santos approach could 
lead to interesting insights. Regulators in different countries may have different signals, and so, may 
have  different  views  on  the  continuation  vs.  liquidation  decision.  Still,  there  are  additional 
complexities, because of the possibility to free ride on the subsidies provided by the other country. 
This issue constitutes one of the major challenges of banking regulation and is vital for the future of 
European Financial integration, where regulation of an institution could be in the hands of one 
institution while monetary policy in the hands of another and this asymmetry affects also the private 
and social costs of a bankruptcy. The classical textbook market imperfections of externalities and 
the provision of public goods are present here. When the major banks in some Eastern European 
countries take the form of a branch and are regulated by other countries regulatory bodies (the Bank 
of Italy or the Oesterreichische Nationalbank), it is a source of concern whether the maximisation of 
the regulator’s home country objectives takes into account all important externalities on the host 
country. The public good provision problem arises because a pan European bank rescue appears as 
a public good to be financed through coordination of a number of Treasuries across Europe. This 
issue is considered in Freixas (2003) and in Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2006). Its implications 
regarding LOLR policy are that  the bail-out of an institution may not be possible, simply because   36 
of the free riding problem. The equilibrium outcome will be more biased towards liquidation than in 
the case of a unique multi-country regulator.  
  Implementation  through  several  regulatory  bodies  of  the  LOLR  decisions  implies  an 
additional number of restrictions. It means, therefore that additional restrictions are imposed on the 
LOLR policy. This implies that type one and type two errors will occur, with the rescue of banks 
that should have been closed down and the liquidation of banks that should have been bailed out.   
 
6. Conclusions 
To conclude, it is worth to compare the classic view of the LOLR with the complexities of the 
above analysis, and try to summarize it by drawing the major lines of the recent advances in the 
contemporaneous approach of LOLR, as compared with the “wisdom of our ancestors”.  What is 
left today of the simple clear-cut guidelines suggested by Thornton and Bagehot that recommend to 
lend to solvent illiquid institutions against good collateral and at a penalty rate? 
First,  lending  to  the  market  through  OMO  is  the  standard  way  for  a  CB  to  prevent  an 
aggregate liquidity shock. This is the contemporaneous version of “lending against good collateral”, 
characteristic of developed financial markets. Yet, recent models of interbank lending teach us hat 
market  imperfections  may  lead  to  other  inefficiencies  that  require  the  LOLR  support  to  extent 
beyond the pure CB responsibility of aggregate liquidity management and lend to individual banks, 
either unsecured or against collateral of lower quality, or guaranteeing their future liquidity (FPR 
2000).  
The second classical recommendation was to lend at a penalty.  This point is now clearly 
controversial.  In  the  presence  of  ex  ante  moral  hazard,  as  in  FPR  (2004),  a  penalty  provides 
managers with the right incentives to be diligent in their lending. Still in Rochet and Vives (2004) 
the recommendation is the opposite, to lend at a rate inferior of the market rate. When, in addition, 
we  consider  decentralization  between  several  regulatory  agencies,  a  penalty  on  interest  rates 
decreases the expected cost of the LOLR loan and imposes a better discipline in banks’ liquidity   37 
management. This will therefore make the LOLR more prone to forbearance, which, as mentioned, 
could either increase or decrease the efficiency of LOLR. In the case of an unbiased regulator, this 
will be efficient, because in case of success, the LOLR will obtain a share of the bank’s profits.  So, 
on the penalty issue there is no clear consensus yet and, hopefully, future work will help regulators 
to implement the efficient policy depending on the economic and financial environment. 
Regarding the use of good collateral, FPR (2004) argue that this is a key feature in the 
intervention of the CB. In their approach the CB intervenes through fully collateralized loans at a 
rate above the T-Bills rate, so that it encompasses a penalty, but below the interbank market rate.   
The above discussion highlights the important notion that, unlike its classical predecessor, 
the LOLR of the twenty-first century lies at the intersection of monetary policy, supervision and 
regulation of the banking industry, and the organization of the interbank market. Again the recent 
financial  markets  turmoil  originated  with  the  subprime  crisis  of  2007  offers  some  insights.  An 
accommodating  monetary  policy,  regulatory  arbitrage  to  save  capital,  and  waves  of  financial 
innovations, which by definition tend to escape traditional prudential regulation, have created the 
conditions for slack credit standards without the rating agencies calling for adequate risk premia. 
The opacity of the assets of the banks and of the finance vehicles created to hold mortgages have 
resulted in a reappraisal of risk premia which combines with a thin market typical of the Akerlof 
lemons problem. Since the Summer of 2007 the CBs on both sides of the Atlantic have responded 
to the credit crunch with massive, coordinated, and repeated injections of liquidity - in the form of 
OMO, discount lending and looser collateral requirements for CB loans - with mixed results. While 
the LOLR interventions have succeed in avoiding defaults of major financial institutions and the 
spreading of systemic risk, the significant adverse selection problems in the interbank market have 
induced banks to hoard some of the extra liquidity instead of recycling it completely to the banks in 
deficit. In the end the important lesson from these events is that the LOLR can be only a partial 
substitute for a well functioning interbank market. Thus the issue is less to understand what rules 
the LOLR should follow but what architecture of prudential regulation, risk supervision, monetary   38 
policy, deposit insurance and ELA is best to guarantee financial stability by providing liquidity to 
banks.   39 
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